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ABSTRACT 
 
As an enterprise, election forecasting has spread and grown. Initial work began in the 
1980s in the United States, eventually travelling to Western Europe, where it finds a 
current outlet in the most of the region’s democracies. However, that work has been 
confined to traditional approaches – statistical modeling or poll-watching. We import a 
new approach, which we call synthetic modeling. These forecasts come from hybrid 
models blending structural knowledge with contemporary public opinion, to generate 
ongoing nowcasts of Western European national contests, from six months prior to 
Election Day itself. These test results, based on election pools from Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and France, encourage similar research on other European electorates.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Election forecasting models are generally applicable and should therefore be 
implemented in a variety of democracies. For developing comparative election 
forecasting models, we build on leading scientific approaches in the field. [For general 
reviews, see Lewis-Beck and Tien (2012), Stegmaier and Norpoth (2013)]. Recent 
applications come from the United States, where the 2012 US presidential election was 
subject to an unprecedented amount of systematic forecasting work. [See Campbell 
(2012), who offered a pre-election review of presidential forecasts; also, see Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier (2014a), and their edited symposium of pedagogical forecasting papers on 
that contest; further, see Linzer and Lewis-Beck (2014), and their edited collection of 
high-tech articles on the dynamics of forecasting that race.] The dominant scientific 
approaches for that election were executed by three groups of forecasters: structuralists, 
aggregators, and synthesizers (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2014a). 
 
These approaches can be delineated by their application of theory, data, and time. Below, 
we outline each, and then consider their application to elections in other democratic 
nations, namely those of Western Europe. After reviewing the relevant work to date, we 
pursue the development of synthetic models for forecasting national elections in 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. In the comparative spirit, we impose one 
overarching theoretical structure – a political economy one – across these three systems. 
As we shall see, the innovation of synthetic models, which combine key elements of the 
structuralist and aggregator methods, provides a promising development in election 
prediction on that side of the Atlantic. 
 
 
2. WAYS OF ELECTION FORECASTING: STRUCTURALISTS, AGGREGATORS, 
SYNTHESIZERS 
 
The front-running scientific approach to election forecasting has been structural 
modeling, a method fully advanced in the United States case. For the 2012 presidential 
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race, examples appear in Abramowitz (2012), Campbell (2012) and Holbrook (2012). 
Such efforts offer a theoretical model of the election outcome, usually beginning with a 
core political economy explanation, e.g., vote = f (presidential popularity, economic 
growth). [For a current review of vote and popularity functions, see Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier (2013).] In this work, the unit of analysis tends to be the nation, the estimation 
ordinary least squares (OLS) on single equations. Further, estimation is static, rather than 
dynamic, resulting in a unique final forecast. 
 
An emergent rival approach to structural modeling, which draws on the public opinion 
polling tradition, is aggregation. For the 2012 presidential race, see the examples and 
discussions by Blumenthal (2014), Jackman (2014), and Traugott (2014). Such analysts 
aggregate vote intention in opinion polls, as in the well-known example from Real Clear 
Politics, which combines voter preferences (in percentages) over a number of multiple 
polls. Distinct from the structuralists, the aggregators offer no theory of the vote. 
Moreover, the unit of analysis is usually the nation. Finally, forecasting is dynamic, with 
repeated estimates across the campaign. 
 
Synthesizers, in contrast to the foregoing methodologies, offer something new. For 
examples, see the work of Erikson and Wlezien (2014), Linzer (2013) or Silver (2012). 
These modelers borrow from the structuralists and the aggregators. They start with a 
political economy theory of the vote, and add to it aggregated and updated polling 
preferences. The data are analyzed either at the national level or the state level. Further, 
the analysis may include multiple equations, and may be Bayesian. Finally, forecasts are 
updated, with multiple estimates over the campaign. Such models join election theory 
with the strengths of aggregation and dynamic updating, and will be the emphasis of our 
European efforts here.  
 
What is the state of the forecasting art in Europe, as compared to the United States? We 
briefly note that structural models dominate the scene. For example, see Dassonneville 
and Hooghe (2012) on Belgium, Magalhães, Aguiar-Conraria and Lewis-Beck (2012) on 
Spain, Nadeau, Lewis-Beck and Bélanger (2010) on France, Whiteley (2005) on the 
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United Kingdom, Norpoth and Gschwend (2010, 2013) on Germany. These efforts tend 
to be based on a political economic theory of voting. Also, the modeling is single-
country, single-equation OLS work. Estimation is static, with one unique forecast issued. 
The unit of analysis is usually, but not always, the nation. Here is a typical French 
example, except for the fact that the unit of analysis is region, rather than nation (Dubois 
and Fauvelle-Aymar, 2004: 216): 
 
 V = 35.97* + 8.44*P - .17*E + e 
 N = 110 (regions from 1986-2002) Adj.R-sq. = .81  
 * = significant at .01. 
 
where V = legislative vote share of parties on the left, first-round; P = popularity of parties on the 
left, SOFRES polls, three months prior to the election; E = regional unemployment rate.  
 
Aggregation, where polls are combined, and systematically used to forecast, is almost 
non-existent in Europe. For a useful exception, see Jennings and Wlezien (2013), who 
amass over 23,000 polls from 41 countries, and examine how well they predict vote 
outcome. This work, useful as it is, has not yet come out in print. However, using 
individual house polls on vote intention to forecast elections represents a long-standing 
tradition, especially within the media. [In particular see the plentiful work on the United 
Kingdom, dating back to the 1980s e.g., Sanders, Hugh and Marsh (1987).] The situation 
worsens with regard to the synthesizers. We know of no published examples of synthetic 
models on a general national election in Europe. In any case, synthetic modeling is what 
we are about. 
 
3. BUILDING SYNTHETIC MODELS FOR ELECTIONS IN EUROPE 
 
Our aim is to combine a sound structural model with a sound polling model, so forming a 
hybrid that can forecast national election outcomes accurately across a sample of 
European democracies. That hybrid will contain an explicitly theoretical and an explicitly 
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nontheoretical component; therefore, we label it a “synthetic” model. First, the proposed 
structural model, with its political economy core, we write as follows: 
 
Vote t = f (Economy, Government Support). 
 
Second, the polling model, which predicts the incumbent vote share as a function of vote 
intention, we write as follows: 
 
Vote t = f (Pollst-x). 
 
The synthetic model combines into one these two models. It begins with the long-term 
fixed effects from electoral theory, as captured in the structural model. Then, it adds to 
that the short-term effects induced by other forces, as represented by the polling model, 
using the latest available information on Vote Intention (VIt-x) to predict the vote. The 
addition of this VIt-x term to the specification can be justified as a solution to a missing 
variables problem. That is, other variables that help predict the vote may occur after the 
structural forecast; or, they may simply not be measurable directly at any time point. To 
the extent VIt-x helps reducing error, this should become evident over time. 
 
The synthetic model thus makes a blend of theory and empirics. And, it takes a dynamic 
form, with progressive re-estimations as the election becomes closer. With reference to 
the 2012 US presidential election forecasting work, then, it is most similar to the 
superlative efforts of Erikson and Wlezien (2013:113-123). We follow a similar 
estimation strategy, i.e., a non-Bayesian one. For the best in Bayesian models, applied to 
US presidential election forecasting, see Linzer’s (2013) paper on the 2008 election, and 
his VOTAMATIC blog for the 2012 election. 
 
In terms of general approach, the synthetic model operates much like contemporary 
weather forecasting models. The fundamental variables governing the atmosphere (here 
the electorate) first generate an event forecast, say a rain storm (here an election). Then 
that forecast is checked against additional, incoming information, as the storm pattern is 
 6 
tracked (here the vote intentions are tracked). Hence, the initial forecast is updated, and 
modified regularly by ever more current forecasts. The process thereby becomes 
dynamic. On the weather analogy, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2014). 
 
4. SYNTHETIC MODEL FORECASTS IN PRACTICE 
 
On each of the European countries under study, we first estimate the structural model (at 
t-6). Then, we estimate the polling model by simply taking the latest single poll that is 
published. (If there is more than one poll at the same time point, we simply average 
them). Finally, we make a combined, single equation synthetic model forecast, with new 
synthetic forecasts at each time a new vote intention poll is out. This dynamic assumes 
that while the structural model is fixed (at t-6), the polling model is updated as polls are 
published. The structural part thus offers a ‘correction’ to each of the vote intention 
polls.2 This formulation allows a new “nowcast” of the election result with each new poll 
(Lewis-Beck and Tien, 2013). For our initial tests, we look at three large, advanced 
democracies of Western Europe: Germany (1980 – 2013), the United Kingdom (1959-
2010), and France (1965-2012). 
 
4.1. GERMANY 
 
We begin with the German case, first estimating the structural model and its out-of-
sample forecast for the most recent election. [For recent structural forecasting work on 
German elections, see Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari and Lewis-Beck (2013); Norpoth and 
Gschwend (2013)]. Then, we carry out estimations from the polling model. Finally, we 
estimate the synthetic model, and its nowcasts from t-6 to Election Day. At the end of the 
section, we evaluate model performance.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2. We additionally estimated models in which instead of using the raw vote intention polls, a 
moving average of polls (from 6 months before the election onwards) is used. Doing so self-
evidently strongly improves the performance of the polling model. The addition of structural 
information to form a synthetic model, however, still offers an improvement to such a voting 
intention model. 
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a. Structural model 
 
As a first step, we estimate a structural model fitting German election results over time. 
The form is a basic political economy model, with an economic indicator (in this case 
GDP growth) and a political indicator (government approval) The dependent variable is 
the combined vote share of the incumbent parties.3 
 
V = β0 + β1 GDPt-6 + β2 Government approvalt-6 + ε 
 
where V is the combined vote share of the incumbent parties: GDP is the GDP growth rate 
(seasonally adjusted and compared to the same quarter in the previous year) in the second quarter 
before the election quarter; Government approval is the mean value of satisfaction with the 
government’s performance (0-10) in the FGW-survey 6 months before the election (see the 
Appendix for data sources).  
 
Estimating the equation (OLS) for German Bundestagelections from 1980 to 2009 yields 
the following: 
 
 
V = 27.157** + 1.701** GDPt-6 + 3.638* Government approvalt-6 
       (5.906)      (0.331)               (1.127) 
 
N = 8 (1980-2009) Adj. R2 = 0.822  
RMSE = 2.994 DW = 3.031 
*** = significant at .001, ** = significant at .01, * = significant at .05. 
 
To make an out-of-sample forecast for the next Bundestag Election, we simply plug into 
the prediction equation the appropriate values for GDP growth and Governmental 
Popularity, at a six months lag, as follows: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3. We follow Norpoth and Gschwend (2010) by only taking into consideration the chancellor’s 
party in case of a Grand Coalition and by only treating SPD as an incumbent party for the 1983 
election. 
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V = 27.157 + 1.701(-0.30) + 3.638 (5.55) 
  =  46.8%  
 
The actual incumbent result = 46.3%, for an absolute forecasting error of 0.5 percentage 
points. 
 
b. Polls model and forecast of the 2013 Bundestag Election 
 
The assumption of the polls model is simply that vote intention polls predict the election 
result. We hence assume that the vote share is a function of the public’s vote intentions, 
as observable in polls. These polls come with some error, however, as sampling errors as 
well as systematic polling house errors are inevitable. 
 
 Vt = f (Vote intentiont-x + ε) 
 
where Vt is the combined vote share of the incumbent parties and Vote intentiont-x is the 
combined vote share incumbent parties obtain in a pre-electoral poll.  
 
In Figure 1, we see the prediction error from the Vote Intention Model over time. First, 
for each poll that was published in the run up to Election Day, the error from the real 
election result was calculated. The regression line reported in Figure 1 is the result of 
regressing these errors on time (measured as days to the election). As we can see, the 
error steadily decreases as the poll estimates moves closer to the day of the election. On 
the eve of the election, the error is reduced to just over 1%.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
c. Synthetic model  
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The synthetic model incorporates the polling model information, generating a nowcast 
from t-6 months to Election Day. Dynamic weights are used to take into account that the 
importance of both information sources can vary over time.4 Polls are assumed to become 
more accurate moving forward – as was also apparent from looking at Figure 1 – and 
therefore are given increasing weight over time. Thus, the weights are adjusted monthly, 
in the manner shown in Table 1.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Incorporating this dynamic yields this overall forecasting equation for the synthetic 
model, 
 
V = β0 + Structural weight*[β1 GDP + β2 Government approval] + Polling weight*[Vote 
intention] + ε 
 
In words, the equation offers a polling correction to the structural forecasts, rendering the 
structural model dynamic. We can now compare its performance to that of the structural 
or polling models taken separately. In Figure 2, the absolute forecasting errors of each of 
the different model forecasts is regressed on time (days to the Election Day). We observe, 
on the one hand, that the structural model alone generates a constant (and low) error over 
time. On the other hand, the polling model alone generates a declining (but always 
higher) error over time. The synthetic model, however, improves on both, offering 
steadily decreasing error that quickly betters the error of the structural model by itself. 
Indeed, by about five months before Election Day, surpasses the accuracy of the polling 
model. The Synthetic Model steadily improves over time, until by Election Day there is 
virtually no forecasting error. In sum, for the German case the synthetic model clearly 
shows gains over either of the other approaches taken alone. 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4. Note that giving both elements a constant equal weight (each part is multiplied by 0.5) does not 
substantially change our conclusions. Results available from the authors upon request. 
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4.2. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
a. Structural model 
 
Election forecasting in the United Kingdom has recently been the focus of considerable 
attention. [See, for example, the edited collection of papers by Gibson and Lewis-Beck 
(2011)]. Different foundational structural models are possible. As a heuristic, we select 
an earlier one, developed by Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Bélanger (2004), which reads 
thusly: 
 
V = β0 + β1 Inflation t-6+ β2 Government approval t-6 + β3 Terms + ε 
 
where V is the combined vote share of the incumbent parties; Inflation is the inflation rate (% 
change) six months before the election; Government approval is Gallup and IPSOS Mori 
government approval data (% satisfied with the way the government is running the country) six 
months before the election. Terms is the number of terms the governing party has been in office 
(see Appendix for data sources).  
 
Estimating this structural model, for general elections in the United Kingdom from 1959 
to 2005, gives us the following result: 
 
V = 36.220*** - 0.816* Inflation + 0.361** Government approval - 2.235 Terms 
         (5.436)     (0.259)                  (0.110)                                        (1.109) 
 
N = 13 (1959-2005) Adj. R2 = 0.630 
RMSE = 3.057 DW = 1.125 
*** = significant at .001, ** = significant at .01, * = significant at .05. 
 
 
Next, we use these estimations to make an out-of-sample forecast of the 2010 general 
election. To this end, we add the structural information (inflation rate, government 
 11 
approval data and the number of terms the incumbent has been in office) into the 
structural model, as follows: 
 
V = 36.220 - 0.816 (2.4) + 0.361(25) - 2.235 (3) 
= 36.6%. 
 
The actual 2010 incumbent result = 29.0%, giving an absolute forecasting error of 7.6 
percentage points. 
 
b. Polls model and forecast of 2010 UK general election 
 
As with the German case, the polls model is as follows, 
 
Vt = f (Vote intentiont-x + ε) 
 
where Vt is the combined vote share of the incumbent parties and Vote intention is the combined 
vote share incumbent parties obtain in pre-electoral polls, at a given point in time.  
 
In Figure 3, we show the error of that prediction from polled vote intention over time. We 
observe that that prediction line remains virtually flat as it moves toward Election Day, 
yielding a forecast error of just over 2 percentage points. 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
c. Synthetic model 
 
The Synthetic Model for the United Kingdom case can be expressed as follows, 
 
V = β0 + Structural weight*[ β1 Inflation + β2 Government approval + β3 Terms] + 
Polling weight*[Vote intention] + ε 
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where V is the combined vote share of the incumbent parties, Inflation is the inflation rate (% 
change) six months before the election, Government approval is Gallup and IPSOS Mori approval 
data (% satisfied with the way the government is running the country) six months before the 
election. Terms is the number of terms the governing party has been in office and Vote intention 
is the vote intention share the incumbent parties obtain in pre-electoral poll(s) at a given point in 
time. 
 
In Figure 4, we see the prediction lines for the three separate models. Regressing each of 
the forecasts on time, the structural model is constant – with its six months lead – while 
the polling and synthetic models are updated as new polls are published. The structural 
model does poorly, with a consistently high error. The vote intention model clearly does 
better, but offers no reduction in error over time. In contrast to both, the synthetic model 
shows a steady decline in prediction error as Election Day approaches, and by election 
eve is only about one percentage point off. 
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.3. FRANCE 
 
a. Structural model 
 
The structural model for French presidential elections takes inspiration for a family of 
political economy models. Most recently, see Nadeau et al. (2010). The form here 
parallels exactly the foregoing German model, reading thusly, 
 
V = β0 + β1 GDPt-6 + β2 Presidential approvalt-6+ ε 
 
where V is the 1st round vote share of the presidential candidate of the incumbent party, GDP is 
the GDP growth rate (seasonally adjusted and compared to the same quarter in the previous year) 
in the second quarter before the election quarter, and Presidential approval is the % of 
respondents stating to be satisfied with how the president is doing his job in the IFOP-survey 6 
months before the election (see Appendix for data sources).  
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Below are the OLS estimates for estimating this model on all French presidential 
elections between 1965 and 2007: 
 
V = 18.666 + 2.988 GDP + 0.066 Presidential approval 
                  (14.189) (1.185)           (0.298) 
 
N = 8 (1965-2007) Adj. R2 = 0.481 
 RMSE = 6.424 DW = 1.816 
 
While all estimated effects are in expected directions, none of them reaches a 
conventional level of statistical significance because of collinearity. However, the overall 
model fit of the French structural model suggests almost half of the variance can be 
accounted for. Thus, we go on to employ the model to make a 2012 forecast.  
 
Next, we rely on this structural model to produce an out-of-sample forecast for the 2012 
French presidential election. We hence plug in the structural information (GDP and 
presidential approval, each with a six months lag) in the equation of the structural model: 
 
V = 18.666 + 2.988 (1.5) + 0.066 (31) 
= 25.2% 
 
The actual 2012 incumbent presidential candidate result = 27.2%, which implies an 
absolute forecasting error of 2 percentage points. 
 
b. Poll model and forecast of 2012 French presidential election 
 
As with the earlier cases of Germany and the United Kingdom, the polling model reads as 
follows: 
 
Vt = f (Vote intentiont-x + ε) 
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where V is the combined vote share of the incumbent parties and Vote intention is the vote share 
the presidential candidate of the incumbent party obtains in pre-election poll(s), at a given point 
in time.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 5, the forecast from the polls alone steadily improves over time, 
falling from an error of about 2.5 percentage points five months out, to about one 
percentage point a month before the election. 
 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
c. Synthetic model 
 
Next, the structural model is combined with the polls, to generate a synthetic model. As 
we did for Germany and the United Kingdom as well, the structural and polling parts are 
weighted to take into account that polls become more accurate predictors of the election 
result over time. 
  
V = β0 + Structural weight*[ β1 GDP + β2 Presidential approval] + Polling weight*[ β3 
Vote intention] + ε 
 
where V is the 1st round vote share of the presidential candidate of the incumbent party; GDP is 
the GDP growth rate (seasonally adjusted and compared to the same quarter in the previous year) 
in the second quarter before the election quarter; and Presidential approval is the % of 
respondents stating to be satisfied with how the president is doing his job in the IFOP-surveys 6 
months before the election. Vote intention is the vote share the presidential candidate of the 
incumbent party obtains in pre-electoral poll(s) for a given point in time.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 6, where we regress each of the model’s predictions on the 
number of days until the election, the structural model works better than the polling 
model until about 4 months out, after which the Polling model does better. However, the 
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synthetic model does better than either, from about three months out, when the error 
drops below two percentage points, and continues to drop. 
 
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
With this paper, we wish to advance election forecasting theoretically and 
methodologically. With respect to theory, we put forward a political economy core 
model, defined structurally by the presence of key macro-economic and macro-political 
indicators, namely economic performance and government satisfaction. We test this 
structural model across a sample of leading Western European democracies, and find that 
it affords a modicum of predictive power, and at a substantial lead (of 6 months before 
the election). However, this structural model, by itself, leaves behind too much 
forecasting error. Further, it offers only static, rather than dynamic, forecasts.  
 
Therefore, we supplement these structural models with polling models, based on vote 
intention. We show that, with the addition of vote intention measures, so forming what 
we call a synthetic model, considerable gains in accuracy can be made in the forecasting 
of these Western European elections. However, it is worth underlining that both 
components of the synthetic model – the structural part and the vote intention part – are 
important. Sometimes the structural model seems to add more, as in the German case, 
while at other times the vote intention part seems to add more, as in the United Kingdom 
case. Or, the contributions may appear mixed within one particular electoral system, as in 
the French case where it appears that the structural component dominated early, the vote 
intention component later. Be that as may be, the essential point remains: the synthetic 
model, with its combination of methods, works better than either of these leading 
methods taken alone. 
 
What is the next step? Clearly, our work takes only a first step. The synthetic model 
needs to be tested against other democratic electorates. That is easier said than done, if 
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our experience at trying to amass the necessary data serves as a guide. We explored other 
Western European democracies, e.g., Norway, The Netherlands, Ireland, but could not 
amass satisfactory data-sets. Of course, these difficulties multiply, when other democratic 
nations, beyond Europe, are considered. Another way to expand the number of 
observations would involve lower the level of analysis, from the nation to the district. For 
instance, in the French case, analysis might go forward with region as the case unit, rather 
than the nation as a whole. But that strategy carries its own difficulties, in particular the 
lack of proper measures of government support, not to mention the technical issue of 
spatial autocorrelation that would demand correction. Nevertheless, these obstacles 
cannot be allowed to stand indefinitely. We must make the effort to apply synthetic 
models to the elections, including second-order elections, of other European democracies. 
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APPENDIX. DATA SOURCES 
 
GERMANY 
 
• Government approval : Data from FGW Politbarometer (1977-2013), question 
wording is « Sind Sie mit den Leistungen der Bundesregierung aus xxx und xxx 
eher zufrieden oder eher unzufrieden ? Bitte beschreiben Sie es wieder mit dem 
Thermometer von plus 5 bis minus 5. ‘Plus 5’ bedeutet, dass Sie mit den 
Leistungen der Regierung voll und ganz zufrieden sind. ‘Minus 5’ bedeutet, dass 
Sie miet den Leistungen der Regierung volständig unzufrieden sind. Auch hier 
können Sie mit den Werten dazwischen Ihre Meinung abgestuft sagen. » and was 
transformed into a 0-10 scale of government approval. For 1983 no information 
was available at six months before the election, approval rates from seven months 
before the election month were employed. 
• GDP: Data are seasonally adjusted quarterly national GDP accounts (change on 
the same quarter of the previous year) and come from the Federal Statistical 
Office Germany (1970-2013). 
• Polling data : Vote intention question from Allensbach, Emnid, Forsa, 
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, GMS, Infratest dimap and INSA polls for the 2013 
elections, as available on www.wahlrecht.de. 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
• Government approval data : 1959-1997 Gallup Poll (Butler & Butler, 2000) ; 
2000-2010 IPSOS Mori (www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll). 
• Inflation: Annual change in retail price index (monthly percentage), as available 
from the Office for National Statistics (www.statistics.gov.uk). 
• Polling data : Voting intention questions as compiled by Mark Pack 
(www.markpack.org.uk/opinion-polls/). 	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FRANCE 
• Presidential approval data: Percentage of respondents saying to be satisfied with 
how the president is doing in IFOP monthly barometer (www.ifop.fr.)  
• GDP: quarterly national GDP growth rates (seasonally adjusted and compared to 
same quarter of the previous year), retrieved from the OECD statistics database 
(stats.oecd.org). 
• Polling data: BVA, CSA, Harris interactive, IFOP, IPSOS, LH2, OpinionWay and 
TNS Sofres vote intention data. Assembled by and retrieved from Jocelyn Evans. 
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Figure 1. Predictive power of polls over time (2013 Bundestagelection) 
 
Absolute errors of vote intention polls (compared to 2013 election result). Solid line indicates 
linear fit of errors regressed on time. 
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Table 1. Importance weights over time 
Time to election Structural weight Polling weight 
-6 months 6/6 0/6 
-5 months 5/6 1/6 
-4 months 4/6 2/6 
-3 months 3/6 3/6 
-2 months 2/6 4/6 
-1 months 1/6 5/6 
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Figure 2. Linear model fit of errors over time, Germany. 
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Figure 3. Predictive power of polls over time (2010 UK general election) 
 
 
Absolute errors of vote intention polls (compared to 2010 election result). Solid line indicates 
linear fit of errors regressed on time. 
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Figure 4. Linear model fit of errors over time, United Kingdom. 
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Figure 5. Predictive power of polls over time (2010 UK general election) 
 
Absolute errors of vote intention polls (compared to 2012 election result). Solid line indicates 
linear fit of errors regressed on time. 
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Figure 6. Linear model fit of errors over time, France. 
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